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China’s military modernisation began long before Xi Jinping became chairman of the Central Military Commission in November 2012. But the pace and scope of that effort has greatly accelerated under him. Key changes include the introduction of advanced weapons and equipment, structural reforms to make the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a more ...
China’s decision to build a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval base in Djibouti was approved by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. This constituted a sea change in its foreign policy and security strategy. The base opened in 2017, enhancing China’s global influence and better protecting its security interests far away from its shores ...
The Maldives is a pivotal part of China’s ‘String of Pearls’ grand strategy. This strategic concept involves China’s efforts to expand its influence through a network of naval bases and commercial ports encircling vital maritime routes. The Maldives is strategically located only 700 kilometres from the Lakshadweep archipelago and 1200 ...
Vietnam’s east coast faces the Chinese island of Hainan where the PLAN’s south fleet is based. China could blockade the east coast of Vietnam quickly, including its main naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. Because Cambodia shares both land and sea borders with Vietnam, a Chinese naval presence in Ream — less than 100 miles from the Vietnamese ...
All branches of the Argentinian military, not just the air force, are in urgent need of modernisation. If the deal goes ahead, the JF-17 project could lay the ground for China’s emergence as a major weapons supplier in a region once dominated by the United States. Yet Beijing’s strategy of financial flexibility with Argentina goes beyond ...
The case for strategic unambiguity on Taiwan. China concluded joint military exercises around Taiwan in May 2024, signalling its capabilities and renewing global concerns over potential conflict. The longstanding ambiguity in the United States' defence relationship with Taiwan has cultivated doubts about US commitment to aid Taiwan in a conflict.
China has also been building up its arsenal of roll-on/roll-off (RO–RO) ferries, which can transport large numbers of vehicles and military personnel. This is a sign that China is bolstering its capabilities for an amphibious invasion, although concerns remain over the vessels' vulnerability in contingency scenarios.
A. From 2012 to 2021, Beijing steadily advanced its claim to ‘historic rights’ in most of the waters, seabed, and airspace of the South China Sea, using coercion and threats of force to do so. But since 2022, the momentum has shifted. Southeast Asian claimants have stopped giving ground. The most well-reported South China Sea story of 2023 ...
Chinese military activities in the sea and airspace surrounding Taiwan have also become more frequent since 2016. While Japan’s proposed capabilities remain asymmetrical to China’s nuclear and missile capabilities, Japan aims to strengthen its deterrence against China in cooperation with the United States.
On 31 May 2021, 16 Chinese military aircraft in ‘tactical formation’ intruded into the airspace of Malaysia’s maritime zone off the coast of Sarawak, Borneo. The incident prompted the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) to scramble its aircraft to identify the Chinese military planes visually.